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Abstract:  
This article demonstrates current copyright enforcement policies often seek to fight piracy while 
promoting cultural diversity by pushing towards the introduction of automated anti-piracy 
systems as a copyright enforcement mechanism. This article aims at demonstrating why 
cultural diversity is likely to be hindered by the introduction of such algorithmic decision-
making if the latter is not carefully regulated. 
Introduction: towards a privatisation of online copyright enforcement 
Digital technologies are changing the way online uses of cultural works are 
monitored. Under the auspices of the Digital Single Market Strategy, the EU 
Commission has adopted proposals to promote ‘better choice and access to content 
online and across borders’ and ‘a fairer and sustainable marketplace for creators, the 
creative industries and the press’ by the means of a new copyright directive and 
intellectual property enforcement strategies.2 For the EU Commission, this requires 
video-sharing platforms to embrace sophisticated technological tools, termed here as 
‘automated anti-piracy systems’ (‘AAPSs’). AAPSs are capable of recognising content 
which right-holders have already identified as their own, and responding based upon 
standing instructions from the holder.3  
                                                             
1 Jacques, Street and Hviid are all members of CREATe and financial support from CREATe is gratefully 
acknowledged.  Garstka is now a member of CIPIL at the University of Cambridge. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
2 European Commission, 6/5/2015, A digital Single Market for Europe: Commission sets out 16 initiatives to 
make it happen, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4919_en.htm. 
3 European Commission, 14/9/2016, State of the Union 2016: Commission proposes modern EU copyright 
rules for European culture to flourish and circulate, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-3010_en.htm. 
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There are risks in the privatisation of decision-making when digital content is blocked, 
filtered or removed. For example, there is a lack of transparency in the design, 
implementation and use of AAPSs. This exacerbates the lack of accountability of 
intermediaries (e.g. video-sharing platforms), and raises concerns that they fail to 
respect fundamental rights compared to other cases where the judiciary, or other 
accountable public authority, would be involved in the decision-making process. 
Additionally, the reliance on AAPSs has consequences for the type of culture enjoyed 
in a particular society. Therefore, it is vital that society creates a sustainable 
environment benefitting established and new artists by guaranteeing fair 
remuneration of online exploitation of works, facilitating licensing possibilities and 
implementing appropriate tools to tackle infringement while taking due consideration 
of fundamental rights.4 
In May 2014, the Council of the European Union issued new guidelines on freedom of 
expression reaffirming that obligations to respect human rights’ principles apply 
equally in the offline and online environments.5 Therefore, the mere fact that mass 
communication and large-scale piracy is facilitated by the Internet, is not sufficient in 
itself to give rise to specific treatment. On the contrary, because new technologies and 
the Internet offer new ways of fostering freedom of expression, we should aim to 
reduce unjustified restrictions on freedom of expression.  
                                                             
4 Also supported by UNESCO, Transforming our world, the 2030 agenda for sustainable development 
available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld, para 8 (last 
access date: 20/12/2017). 
5 Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline, 
Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 12/5/2014, available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/documents/eu_human_rights_guidelines_on_freedom_of_expr
ession_online_and_offline_en.pdf (last access: 06/07/2017); Fatullayev v Azerbaijan (22/4/2010) 
application No. 40874/07; though the duties and responsibilities may differ for online intermediaries 
compared to traditional publishers. MTE v Hungary, (2/2/2016), ECtHR (para 45), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2016/135.html (last access: 06/07/2017);  Delfi AS v Estonia, 
(16/6/2015), ECtHR (para 113), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-
155105?TID=qowwttwprb (last access: 06/07/2017); General Comment No. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, 
adopted on 12/9/2011, para 12. 
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Freedom of expression is closely intertwined with the preservation and promotion of 
cultural diversity.6 Although the aim of fostering cultural diversity is widely 
recognised,7 challenges remain in analysing the relationship and interaction between 
cultural diversity and freedom of expression. These challenges loom large in the 
digital environment. Therefore, one may begin to wonder whether an obligation to 
deploy AAPSs on online-sharing platforms might run counter to the promotion of 
cultural diversity. Will requiring private entities to determine what unauthorised use 
is an ‘infringement’ (using a specific software), have an adverse effect on freedom of 
expression? Might an obligation to deploy AAPSs on online-sharing platforms run 
counter to the promotion of cultural diversity? After all, the digital environment 
enables distribution and communication of artistic and cultural expressions across 
borders and cultures in an unprecedented manner. While many may have very little 
economic value, they may, nevertheless, be indispensable for individual fulfilment 
and participation in a democratic society. 8 
This article reviews some of the reforms proposed for the use of AAPSs. Section 1 
focuses on the regulatory framework in which these AAPSs arose. As private 
initiatives, these algorithms have often been characterised as going beyond what is 
prescribed under the current regulatory framework, including the safe harbour 
provisions, which go some way to relieve intermediaries from liability arising from 
infringing content shared by third parties.9 As the regulatory framework is linked to 
the rise of AAPSs, section 2 discusses algorithms as enforcement mechanisms for the 
identification and removal of online content by looking at the technology itself. 
                                                             
6 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127162e.pdf and UNESCO, Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005) available at  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf (last access: 06/07/2017). 
7 There is no agreement as to a definition of this dynamic concept. JS Curtis, ‘Culture and the Digital 
Copyright Chimera: Assessing the International Regulatory System of the Music Industry in Relation 
to Cultural Diversity’ (2006) 13 International Journal of Cultural Property 59, 62. 
8 The importance of these cultural expressions is recognised in Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions which notes that ‘cultural activities, goods and services have both 
an economic and cultural nature, because they convey identities, values and meanings, and must 
therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value’. UNESCO, supra footnote 6 (p.2). 
9 Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis and Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 
(March 29, 2016) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628. 
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Finally, section 3 elaborates on the need to protect and promote freedom of expression 
and cultural diversity to foster creativity, collaboration and fair remuneration in the 
online environment.  
The Reign of Algorithms: DMCA, E-Commerce Directive and EU Proposed New 
Copyright Directive. 
AAPSs, such as YouTube’s in-house ‘Content ID’ rights management system, were 
developed in response to two pieces of legislation, the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 1998 (‘DMCA’) and EU Electronic Commerce Directive 2000 (‘E-
commerce Directive’)10, but to the resulting ‘whack-a-mole’ played by online 
infringers and copyright enforcers in- and outside the courtroom.  
The DMCA and its judicial interpretation 
The DMCA was enacted by US Congress to strike a balance between the demands of 
copyright holders for more online protection against the demands of online service 
providers (‘OSPs’) to be shielded from liability for infringing third-party content on 
their sites.11 This led to the introduction of the ‘safe harbor’12 provisions in section 512 
of chapter 17 of the U.S. Code. Under these safe harbour provisions, OSPs are not 
liable for the actions of their users, if certain steps are taken; most notably, if infringing 
content is taken down promptly upon notice from the right-holder. To benefit from 
this protection, an OSP must correspond to one of the categories of online services and 
meet the attached requirements.13  
Legal requirements for the safe harbour to apply in relation to hosting activities 
Amongst these,14 section 512 (c) relates to hosting activities. The OSP will be protected 
if (i) its involvement is limited to 'storage at the direction of a user of material that 
                                                             
10 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8/6/2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 
178, 17/7/2000, 1–16. 
11 Benjamin Boroughf, ‘The next great YouTube: Improving Content ID to foster creativity, cooperation 
and fair compensation’ (2015) 25(1) Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 95, 102. 
12 In the EU, these are referred to as ‘safe harbour’, from here onwards the authors refer to ‘safe harbour’ 
interchangeably.  
13 17 U.S.C § 512(a) - (d). 
14 For more, see Urban and al., footnote 9. 
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resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider’; 
and (ii) that the OSP has neither actual knowledge that the information stored infringed 
copyright15 nor constructive knowledge (resulting from the awareness of ‘facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent’16) of this fact. Furthermore, 
as soon as the OSP has acquired such knowledge, it must act expeditiously to remove 
or disable access to the alleged infringing content.17 Placing the responsibility for 
identifying infringing content on the copyright holder, the Act further protects OSPs 
by specifying what a valid notification of infringement should contain.18 For example, 
a notification is only valid if it is communicated in writing to the OSP and includes a 
statement that the complaining party believes in good faith that ‘use of the material in 
the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the 
law’.19 Finally, the OSP must not ‘receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to 
control such activity’.20 Yet, the DMCA does not impose any obligation upon an OSP 
to actively monitor the use made of its service or to be pro-active in searching for 
content which may infringe copyright. 21 
In addition to these specific conditions, OSPs are subject to two general requirements 
which oblige them to implement ‘a policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s 
system or network who are repeat infringers’, and to notify subscribers and account 
holders of that policy.22 Secondly, OSPs must accommodate the ‘standard technical 
measures’ used by right-holders to identify their copyright works.23 Section 512(i)(2) 
refers to technical measures which have been developed pursuant to a broad 
                                                             
15 17 U.S.C § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
16 17 U.S.C § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
17 17 U.S.C § 512(c)(1)(C). 
18 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
19 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
20 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). 
22 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii). 
23 ibid. 
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consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, 
multi-industry standards process.24 
Active role of US courts 
The meaning of these provisions came to be tested in a lengthy line of judicial 
decisions. In a brief summary, several patterns emerge as a result.  First, following the 
landmark dispute in Viacom v. YouTube25 (settled in 2014) and the decisions in Capitol 
Records v MP3Tunes26 and Veoh27 it became sound and clear that the DMCA does not 
impose a duty on the OSPs to monitor content on their platform, without a notification 
– the said burden rests on the right-holders, even if fingerprinting technology is 
available.28 The OSP can still be liable for contributory copyright infringement, if it 
fails to respond to valid takedown requests – as it happened in Capitol Records v MP3 
Tunes. 
The situation seems to be less clear in situations where there is evidence that the 
human representatives of an OSP saw or interacted with the contested content before 
the notification. In Capitol Records v Vimeo,29 the Second Circuit stated that the mere 
fact that a video reproduced a recognisably protected song did not mean that it would 
be obvious to an employee of the OSP that the use might be infringing – and safe 
harbour protection was maintained.30 On the other hand, the Ninth circuit might be 
heading in the opposite direction, as in Mavrix Photographs v LiveJournal, the volunteer 
moderators were found to be of similar status to the OSP’s employees – hence, in the 
                                                             
24 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). 
25 Viacom International v YouTube (2010) 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS); appeal Second Circuit: 10-3270-cv, 2012 WL 
1130851 (5/4/2012); District Court ruling: 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (18/4/2013). 
26 (2011) 821 F.Supp.2d 627. 
27 UMG Recordings v Shelter Capital Partners (2013) No. 09-55902, at [25, 30]. 
28 At [117] and [120]. The Second Circuit and District Court consequently disagreed with the Ninth 
Circuit’s UMG v. Shelter Capital ruling and distinguished the Viacom case from the Grokster decision. 
Yet, the Court of Appeal in 2012 had found that a reasonable jury could find YouTube had actual or 
constructive knowledge of specific infringements which led to the case being remanded for factual 
determinations before Justice Stanton found again that YouTube could not be held liable. Viacom 
International v Youtube (2012) 676 F.3d 19, at [73]. 
29 (2016) 14-1048 2d Cir. 
30 ibid, at [39]. In March 2017, the Supreme Court rejected to hear an appeal. 
7 
 
upcoming judgement, the line of interpretation from Vimeo might come to be 
challenged.31 
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that with the 2016 decision in Lenz v. Universal 
Music Group32 saga (revolving around a home video of a baby dancing to Prince’s 
‘Let’s go crazy’ hit for less than 30 seconds), it was determined that before sending a 
notice, the right-holder should verify whether the material is authorised by law, under 
the fair use doctrine.33  However, as right-holders only have to demonstrate the 
subjective good faith belief that the material infringes copyright, there is no imposed 
obligation on right-holders to determine the application of fair use in casu. The Court 
also noted that AAPSs could be used to pre-screen material and filter out clear-cut 
cases of infringement,34 while leaving the remaining material to human review.  
Finally, there is an uncertainty associated to the rules implemented by the US 
Copyright Office. Since December 2016, it is necessary for online intermediaries who 
wish to take advantage of the safe harbour to register themselves with the Copyright 
Office, and this registration requires renewal every three years.35  One might question 
whether this new procedure is compatible with section 512, as the registration and 
renewal process seems tantamount to adding a new requirement before the liability 
exemption applies, which is not explicitly provided for in the legislation. 
The E-commerce directive and its judicial interpretation 
Across the pond, the EU legislator found inspiration in the DMCA when similar safe 
harbour provisions were introduced in the E-Commerce Directive36 (implemented in 
the E-Commerce Regulations 2002 in the UK)37. This includes three intermediary 
                                                             
31 (2017) 14-56596 9th Cir. 
32 Lenz v. Universal Music group (2016) No. 13-16106. 
33 At [11]. 
34 At [19]. 
35 US Copyright Office, Copyright Office announces electronic system for designating agents under the 
DMCA (31/10 2016) Issue no. 640, available at https://www.copyright.gov/newsnet/2016/640.html  
36 Supra footnote 10. 
37 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 No. 2013. Considering Brexit, the UK’s 
legal framework regarding safe harbour provisions and AAPSs is burdened by the surrounding 
uncertainty tied to the country’s decision to leave the EU. Yet, it is reasonable to imagine that the EU 
legal framework will still be influential as the relevant directives are of EEA relevance.  
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liability regimes, mimicking the three categories of intermediaries covered in the 
DMCA. Articles 12 to 14 of the E-Commerce Directive refer, respectively, to mere 
conduit, caching and hosting harbours.  
Like its US counterpart, article 14 only permits the hosting intermediary to benefit 
from the liability exemption, if they do not possess ‘actual knowledge of illegal activity 
or information’.38 As far as claims for damages are concerned, the intermediary is only 
immune if they are not  ‘aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity 
or information is apparent’.39 Yet, once such knowledge is obtained, the intermediary 
must act expeditiously40 to remove access to the alleged infringing content. 41 As in the 
US, article 15 does not oblige an intermediary to monitor the content hosted on its 
platform.42 
The hosting provision43  is the one which attracted the most attention from the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’), as well as the English courts. The 
jurisprudence confirms that the threshold to qualify as a ‘host’ is low.44 As such, most 
online platforms, including social media websites, will be hosting service providers 
for the purposes of article 14.45 Instead, difficulties arise when assessing when the role 
played by the intermediary extends beyond ‘mere hosting’, meaning that they might 
no longer benefit from the exemption.  
                                                             
38 Supra footnote 10, art. 14(1)(a). 
39 ibid. 
40 Supra footnote 10, art. 14(1)(b). 
41 ibid. 
42 C-360/10 Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) v Netlog NV [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, at [53]; C-324/09 L’Oréal SA v eBay International AG [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474, at 
[139]; C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2011], at [40]. That said, as Kulk and Zuiderveen rightly note, these provided little guidance on how 
article 15 would be applied to more specific preventive filtering schemes. S. Kulk and F. Zuiderveen, 
‘Filtering for copyright enforcement in Europe after the Sabam cases’ (2012) 34(11) E.I.P.R. 791, 794. 
43 Mirroring section 512(c) of the DMCA. 
44 Supra footnote 42; C-236/08 Google France SARL v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:159, at [112]. 
45 See footnote 42, at [27]. 
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In Google v Louis Vuitton46 as clarified in L’Oréal v eBay47 (both being trade mark 
infringement cases), the CJEU determined that for the safe harbour to apply, the 
hosting intermediary should not play an ‘active’ role and must remain neutral in the 
transfer of information.48 Illustrating this, the CJEU indicates that an intermediary has 
an active role where it ‘has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising 
the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers’.49 
Similarly, spelling and grammar checking of third party content may amount to 
constructive knowledge, and trigger liability on the part of the intermediary.50 In 
essence, the less interaction the intermediary has with the content it is hosting, the less 
likely it is that the intermediary will have constructive knowledge of any potentially 
infringing activity on the platform.51 Ergo, the online intermediary must be measured 
against the reasonable man, having a duty of care to remove content, which has been 
detected as illegal.  
The CJEU’s interpretation seems to depart from the objective standard usually 
attributed to the reasonable man, since it refers to the particular knowledge and 
expertise the intermediary should have in light of the facts. While notification letters 
from right-holders may inform the online intermediary that alleged infringing content 
is present on their platform, not all courts are ready to accept these letters alone as 
sufficient proof of knowledge. Indeed, in Davison v Habeeb,52 a case involving 
defamatory content, the English High Court commented that a notice of this kind does 
not automatically trigger liability, since said notice ‘may turn out to be insufficiently 
precise or inadequately substantiated’.53 
                                                             
46 Supra footnote 44. 
47 C-324/09, footnote 42. 
48 See footnote 44, at [114] and footnote 41, C-324/09, at [116].  
49 See footnote 42, C-324/09, at [116]. 
50 In a UK defamation case: Kaschke v Gray [2010] EWHC 690 (QB), at [86]. 
51 It is undeniable that actual knowledge is easier to prove. E.g. in The Pirate Bay case, the intermediary 
openly ridiculed the notice and takedown system by publishing the takedown letters on their home 
page. Failing to act expeditiously upon the takedown requests, The Pirate Bay could not benefit from 
the exemption. Case B-13301-06, District Court of Stockholm, judgment delivered on the 17th of April 
2009.  
52 [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB). 
53 ibid, at [122]. 
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The fact that an online intermediary must have gained actual or constructive 
knowledge of the presence of infringing content on its platform constitutes one of the 
biggest challenges linked of this provision. As discussed, one way to bring the alleged 
infringing content to the attention of the intermediary is for the right-holder to notify 
by letter. As hinted by the court in Davison v Habeeb,54 this has the potential to lead to 
abuses by the right holders, if intermediaries react and remove content based upon 
unsubstantiated allegations. In cases where infringement is contested by the end-user, 
an intermediary is aware that it may be excluded from the safe harbour, if it is not 
seen to respond expeditiously to the notification. While in many cases, the infringing 
nature of the online activity may be uncontentious, it is still reasonable to argue that 
an intermediary should not replace the role of the judiciary in decisions which remove 
or block content. And yet, the current state leads us to believe that the EU safe harbour 
regime has suffered from the courts’ interpretation of these provisions, because in 
practice, national courts have still managed to find ways of holding an intermediary 
liable by stretching the ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ requirement.55 This feeds 
the legal uncertainty surrounding the safe harbour provisions.56 Similarly, Valgaeren 
and Roland suggest that some courts seem to operate from the starting assumption 
that intermediaries should be liable, especially if they profit from facilitating the 
infringing activities of their users, and then try to find justification as to why the safe 
harbour should not apply.57 
Building a bridge between both systems 
There are three key differences between the US and the EU regime. Firstly, the US safe 
harbour provisions are part of copyright legislation whereas the EU E-Commerce 
Directive covers illicit content in general. Secondly, the US regime could appear more 
robust as the legislator included the obligation to notify the user about the notice for 
                                                             
54 Ibid. 
55 Lilian Edwards, 'The Fall and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online' in Edwards L. and Waelde C. 
(eds), Law and Internet (Hart, 2009) 47, 84. 
56 Pekka Savola, ‘Blocking injunctions and website operators' liability for copyright infringement for 
user-generated links’ (2014) 36(5) E.I.P.R., 285; Erik Valgaeren and Nicolas Roland, 'Youtube and social 
networking sites – new kids on the block?', in Strowel A. and Triaille J-P. (eds), Google et les nouveaux 
services en ligne (Larcier, 2008) 224. 
57 ibid. 
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takedown within the statute itself.58 Thirdly, the US legal framework sets up a specific 
counter-notice procedure.59 While EU legislation does not include these specific 
provisions, case law filled many of these gaps in a similar way in the years since the 
legislation was adopted.60 
The current legal framework is too burdensome for right-holders 
Based upon the sheer volume of shared content on digital platforms, right-holders 
soon began to argue that the safe harbour provisions established an environment 
incompatible with copyright protection. This line of argument assumes that the 
procedures place too high a burden upon the right-holders to secure the removal of 
infringing content. With the advent of digital fingerprinting technologies and the like, 
right-holders argue that intermediaries are best positioned to combat online 
infringement, using the AAPSs becoming available.61 However, the counterclaim is 
that just because intermediaries are infrastructurally best-placed to deal with 
infringing content, it does not follow that they are best-placed to assess whether there 
is an infringement in casu. Indeed, it is doubtful62 that just because technological tools 
may be used to detect and identify content that is identical or similar to a protected 
third party work, intermediaries are equipped to determine which unauthorised use is 
an infringement. Despite these concerns, the safe harbour regime in both jurisdictions 
is currently undergoing review. 
Looking at what lies ahead, the EU Commission’s proposal for a Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market has already attracted a lot of attention. One 
aim of this new directive is to address the ‘value gap’.63 This describes the apparently 
                                                             
58 17 U.S.C § 512(g)(2)(A). 
59 17 U.S.C § 512 (g)(2)(B and C). 
60 M Yakobson, ‘Copyright liability of online service providers after the adoption of the E.C. Electronic 
Commerce Directive: a comparison to U.S. law’ (2000) 11(7) Ent. L.R., 144-152, 151. 
61 Boroughf, footnote 11, 103. 
62 Especially given potential conflict of commercial of interests between intermediaries and right-
holders.  
63 Another problematic proposal concerns the introduction neighbouring rights for press publishers for 
digital uses. Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko and Giancarlo Frosio, Opinion of the CEIPO on the 
European Commission’s copyright reform proposal, with a focus on the introduction of neighbouring rights for 
press publishers in EU law (28/11/2016) available at 
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unfair distribution of revenue between the various players which is generated from 
online uses of copyright-protected works, and which has arisen owing to the growth 
of the streaming market in both the US and the EU. Given that the ad-funded websites 
typically rely upon user-generated content (‘UGC’) to flourish, the perceived 
‘problem’ is that their intermediary’s activities go beyond those properly protected by 
the safe harbour.64 Nevertheless, the intermediaries still invoke these provisions 
(especially article 14),65 rather than reach agreements with right-holders to license the 
copyright-protected works.66 While subscription-based services, such as Spotify, 
accept that they must be licensed by right-holders, ad-funded services do not. Initially, 
right-holders viewed such services as an effective promotional tool, which was 
expected to result in additional revenue from the authorised operators. However, it 
has transpired that many users seem satisfied to consume works via free streaming 
alone, meaning the anticipated revenue from downloads has not materialised. The 
advertising revenue generated by these ad-funded websites is thus presented as a loss 
of revenue for right-holders.  
The solution in the (in)famous article 13 of the proposed new Directive 
The proposed new article 13 is directly aimed at ad-funded online sharing platforms, 
such as YouTube, and is motivated by the problem of unlicensed protected content on 
these platforms. At this stage, the scope of this provision is hard to predict. 67  Some 
                                                             
http://www.ceipi.edu/fileadmin/upload/DUN/CEIPI/Documents/CEIPI_Opinion_on_the_introd
uction_of_neighbouring_rights_for_press_publishers_in_EU_final.pdf  
64 More worrying is the implementation and judicial interpretation of the E-Commerce Directive 
(especially regarding the knowledge required under article 14) which differ greatly from a member 
state to another. Thibault Verbiest, Gerald Spindler, Giovanni Maria Riccio  & Aurelie Van der Perre, 
Study on the liability of internet intermediaries (2007) Markt/2006/09/E – Service Contract 
ETD/2006/IM/E2/69, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-
commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf  
65 Google v Louis Vuitton, footnote 46. 
66 Yet, now major ad-funded online services are licensed in practice. See for example the PRS for music 
– YouTube deal: http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/press/latestpressreleases/pages/prs-for-
music-and-youtube-sign-licensing-deal.aspx .  
67 Though clarity as to the existing categories of intermediaries and the need to add more have partly 
driven this new proposal. European Commission, Synopsis report on the public consultation on the 
regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries and the collaborative economy, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=15877,  1; European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
13 
 
lobbying groups are advocating an alternative route which seeks to distinguish 
between the type of uses made of a protected work, instead of categorising online 
intermediaries.68 For example, one could imagine that non-commercial online sharing 
triggers the safe harbour provision, whereas commercial uses require cooperation 
between the intermediary and right-holders. This appears sensible, since safe 
harbours, in any event, do not shield intermediaries from injunctions based on article 
8(3) Infosoc Directive and article 11 of the Enforcement Directive (combined with 
recital 59). 
Further concerns relate to the interaction between the proposed copyright directive 
and the safe harbour provisions included in the E-commerce Directive. Recital 38 of 
the draft directive states that article 13 does not impinge on the safe harbour regime 
of article 14 of the E-commerce Directive, meaning that online intermediaries falling 
under the categories of article 13 must enter contractual arrangements with right-
holders. Here, the report of the Legal Affairs committee (JURI), following the efforts 
of rapporteur Michal Boni, tries to ensure that the new provision does not contradict 
the existing framework by upholding the principles enshrined in the E-Commerce 
Directive69 and respecting the legal principle lex specialia generalibus derogant.70  
This suggests that Google v Louis Vuitton71, as clarified in L’Oréal v eBay72, and an ‘active 
role’ of the hosting intermediary sets the bar for the proposed article. While the 
original proposed article 13(1) by the Commission seemed to require (all) online 
intermediaries to prevent the availability of infringing content on their platforms, the 
amendments suggested by JURI are welcomed. In addition to establishing that article 
                                                             
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Online platforms and the Digital 
Single Market – Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288/2, 9. 
68 Martin Doucha, Computer Scientist’s Review of the EPRS ‘InfoSoc’ Directive’ (25/11/2016) available 
at https://medium.com/eu-copyright-reform/computer-scientists-review-of-the-eprs-infosoc-
directive-review-ed7969ccbffb#.tzrjraqyl  
69 European Parliament, Draft Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital single Market, 
2016/0280(COD),  amendments 3 & 9. 
70 The EU Parliament is now considering the Commission’s copyright package. Time will tell whether 
the Parliament is satisfied that self-regulation is adequately counter-balanced with a strong legislative 
framework.  
71 See footnote 46. 
72 See footnote 47. 
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13 does not impede on the safe harbour regime, it removes the reference to specific 
technologies such as content recognition technologies (aka AAPSs). This newer 
version, by removing the imposition of filtering measures as part of the duty of care 
of all intermediaries, goes some way in softening the original text.   
Finally, recital 45 boldly asserts that the draft directive respects fundamental rights 
and principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(‘EU Charter’). Recital 46 further acknowledges the need to protect personal data, in 
line with articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter. And yet, despite this, the proposed article 
13 seems to be prejudicial to an end-user’s rights to freedom of expression and the 
protection of their personal data. In this regard, the proposal contained in article 13(2), 
that ISPs in cooperation with right-holders must give users an opportunity, a posteriori, 
to object to any blocking, filtering or removal of content is arguably inadequate.73 
While the current text does not refer directly to AAPSs anymore, this legal reform 
clearly demonstrates a current trend towards the implementation of technologies, 
which sits uneasily with permitted uses of protected works under the law, such as for 
parody, quotation or education.74 Especially, in the latest proposals from the Estonian 
presidency, the counter-notice (including the application of copyright exceptions) will 
be decided by right-holders only. 
If the result of these legislative changes is that online sharing platforms do lose safe 
harbour protection, then we might anticipate that their business model will have to 
change. Either the intermediary must take responsibility and actively monitor all 
content shared on their platform, or they would need to ensure that they generate 
enough revenue, e.g. by introducing minimum guarantees on music streams such as 
those demanded from subscription streaming music services.75 
                                                             
73 Moreover given the proposals made by the Estonian presidency beginning of September 2017.  
74 This seems to overlook one of the goals of the EU Parliament. European Parliament resolution of 
9/6/2015 on ‘Towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: An EU 
Action Plan’ (2014/2151(INI)), at 60. 
75 This model could push ad-funded intermediaries to ensure that advertising is not skipped or blocked 
by users anymore. In the case of YouTube, the platform will need to disable the ‘TrueView Ad’ where 
the user can skip the in-stream advertising. Music publishers and record labels might still not be 
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Consequently in the current proposed form, article 13 and its related recitals, has the 
potential to induce a significant chilling effect on freedom of expression, and thereby 
presents a risk of non-legitimate interference with fundamental rights and principles 
more broadly. The statement that the directive is de facto compliant with fundamental 
rights lacks substantive justification and seems reliant upon the blind trust placed in 
private commercial entities. Rather, like a ticking time bomb, article 1376 has the 
potential to explode the fragile balance of the copyright paradigm, up-end the current 
intermediary liability regime and distort competition.77  
The rise of automated anti-piracy systems to fight online piracy. 
Both the EU and the USA have established enforcement regimes which if not inviting 
are at least are compatible with automation.78 This may be justified by the 
international intellectual property framework, since article 8 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (together with its Agreed Statement) states: ‘mere provision of physical 
facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to 
communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention’79. As such, 
signatory parties must ‘permit effective action against any act of infringement of rights 
                                                             
satisfied with these measures. From their point of view, free or ad-funded services are unsustainable if 
they do not land to subscriptions. See https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/products/youtube-
trueview.html; http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/warner-punches-above-its-weight-
without-relying-on-pop-fads/  
76 EDRI, Deconstructing article 13 of the copyright proposal of the European Commission (2016) available at 
https://edri.org/files/copyright/copyright_proposal_article13.pdf; Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, 
Eleonora Rosati, Karmen Turk, Christina Angelopoulos, Aleksandra Kucszerawy, Miquel Peguera and 
Martin Husovec, A brief exegesis of the proposed copyright directive (2016) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2875296  
77 The CJEU has previously held that filtering jeopardises the fair balance which must be struck between 
the protection of fundamental rights to property (including IP) and other fundamental rights (such as 
the freedom to conduct a business). See C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v 
Telefónica de España SAU (29/1/2008) ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, at [68].  
78 For the EU: see proposed new copyright Directive (article 13 and recitals 38 & 39); in the US, the Office 
of US Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) also condoned these private arrangements. 
E.g. Office of the US Intellectual Property Enforcement, Joint Strategic Plan, 35 (2013) and Role of 
Voluntary Agreements in the US Intellectual Property System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary (113th Cong. (2013)). 
79 WCT Agreed Statement regarding article 8. 
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covered by this Treaty, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements’.80 
While the E-Commerce Directive and DMCA do not mention AAPSs explicitly, the 
trend towards the latter could be a path to practical compliance with the WIPO 
treaties. Firstly, the burden currently falls on the right-holders to prove that an 
intermediary does not meet the safe harbour requirements, which, in most cases, 
results in high costs for right-holders in proving that the intermediary does not meet 
the requirements to benefit from the harbour.81 Hence, there is pressure on both right-
holders and intermediaries (who need to deal with the sheer volume of notices 
expeditiously) to develop technological tools which automatically detect online 
content without the need for any human oversight. Secondly, preparing a valid 
takedown notification every time an infringing copyright work is located is 
burdensome for the right-holders, given the possible sheer scale of online 
infringement. Therefore, it is reasonable that the right-holders will wish to automate 
the sending of notices to intermediaries. Indeed, neither the E-Commerce Directive nor 
the DMCA impose a limit on the volume of notices, which can be sent to a single 
intermediary with the expectation of expeditious removal. Thus, intermediaries faced 
with huge numbers of notices might wish to automate their processing. Finally, it is 
then a short step for intermediaries to automate the procedure of notifying users that 
some of their content is being taken down, resulting in fully automated 
systematisation of online copyright enforcement. 
Consequently, for the processing of takedown notifications without jeopardising the 
competitiveness of their business, there is a commercial push for right-holders 
(typically represented by collecting rights societies) and intermediaries to collaborate. 
Yet, one might wonder whether such collaboration in a digital environment (which 
facilitates the connection of cultures) creates a danger that unique cultural differences 
                                                             
80 Articles 14 WCT and 23 WPPT. 
81 Some right-holders argue that these intermediaries should act as gatekeepers as the advent of 
technologies puts them in a better position to tackle online copyright infringement. Boroughf, supra 
footnote 11, 103; R. Alderfer-Rock R ‘Fair Use Analysis in DMCA Takedown Notices: Necessary or 
Noxious?’ (2014) 86(3) Temple Law Review, 694.  
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will be consumed by homogenisation, or be misappropriated owing to ineptitude on 
the part of the legal framework. 
In the absence of any over-arching legal obligation, algorithms have been introduced 
because of voluntary private initiatives, built upon agreements between right-holders 
and intermediaries, which increase the right-holder’s control over works shared 
online by third parties.82  
The birth and evolution of Content ID 
YouTube is without doubt the most prominent video-streaming platform in 
cyberspace. YouTube also operates the most renowned example of a currently AAPS 
– the Content ID system - the result of US$60 million of investment. This rights 
management system was first introduced mid-2007, contemporaneously with the 
dispute in the Viacom case, as the result of agreements between YouTube and a 
number of the major record labels and musical publishers, extended later to 
independent labels too. Ever since its launch, Content ID has been the subject of 
periodic changes. YouTube generates revenue to cover its operational cost by selling 
advertising which is viewed alongside the uploaded content when protected works 
are shared using YouTube. This money is shared between YouTube and the right-
holder according to the agreed terms. Over time, as Content ID became more 
sophisticated, the agreements between YouTube and right-holders have evolved too, 
to the extent that Content ID is now on the path to creating monopolies for copyright-
holders. 
                                                             
82 Qualified as ‘DMCA Plus’ intermediaries in the seminal empirical study from 2016, by Urban, 
Karaganis and Schofield. Later, Bridy distinguished two types of DMCA Plus intermediaries. DMCA 
Plus type 1 relates to intermediaries covered by the DMCA safe harbours and which voluntarily 
venture into private monitoring initiatives and type 2, comprising the intermediaries who venture into 
simile voluntary private initiative but which do not meet the safe harbour provisions’ requirements. 
These intermediaries going beyond the DMCA (or E-commerce directive) measures, by implementing 
elements of enforcement infrastructure as filtering systems, direct takedown options for trusted right-
holders, hash-matching “stay-down” systems and contractual agreements. Urban and al., footnote 9; 
Annemarie Bridy, ‘Copyright’s digital deputies: DMCA-Plus enforcement by Internet intermediaries’ 
in John A. Rothchild (ed.), Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 
2016) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628827 
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Moving beyond being merely a way for right-holders to generate revenue, the next 
stage of development was a mechanism, which identified if a protected work was 
being shared. Using digital fingerprinting technology,83 the complex algorithm cross-
checks all newly-uploaded content against an established database of copyright-
protected works based upon the collecting societies’ repertoires and those of other 
partners. This sophisticated database84 not only comprises a reference file for the 
copyright-protected work but also includes ‘asset’ metadata i.e. a wide range of the 
content’s inherent properties. As a result, the fingerprinting algorithm is able to detect 
any part of audio or video content, even if modified, which is stored in the database 
repository. Uploading of any content which finds a ‘match’, in whole or part,  results 
in an automated notification being sent to the relevant right-holders.  
Content ID: a highly customisable tool 
Right-holders are given five options (from least to most restrictive according to 
YouTube):  
(1) do nothing;  
(2) add advertising and collect the revenue; 
(3) monitor its viewing statistics;85 
(4) block its content (the content will not be audible or viewable on YouTube); or,  
(5) issue a manual take-down request. 
Right-holders may elect the course of action to be taken in advance, meaning that this 
course of action will be pursued automatically in the event that matching content is 
uploaded to the platform. The algorithm’s operation has become increasingly faster 
and smarter. It is faster because the database now operates on short snippets, rather 
                                                             
83 Digital fingerprinting is to be distinguished from watermarking. If both techniques allow the unique 
identification of content they differ in their aims and operationDominic Milano, Content control: digital 
watermarking and fingerprinting (Rhozet White Paper) available at 
https://www.digimarc.com/docs/default-source/technology-resources/white-
papers/rhozet_wp_fingerprinting_watermarking.pdf  
84 At the time of writing, Google indicates that within Content ID database, such files number to over 
50 million, what can be equalled to over 600 years of audio and visual content.  
85 Added in 2009.  
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than the entire original file,86 and content is checked against Content ID during the 
uploaded process, rather than waiting until the content has ‘gone live’. The system is 
smarter because it can detect modified content through a match with the reference file 
stored in the database, and because the usage policy assigned can differ depending on 
the degree to which the detected file matches the original.87 The customisation offers 
unique possibilities for right-holders. For example, Content ID partners can choose 
the type of content monitored (audio only, video only or both), the percentage or time 
of user-uploaded content matching the partner’s content or the amount in percentage 
or time of partner reference file matched in the UGC.  
The design flaws: copyright equilibrium endangered? 
While being highly sophisticated, Content ID is not without flaws. The most severe 
limitation of AAPSs is an inability to take account of the careful balance struck by 
legislators between the protection granted to right-holders to control uses of their 
works and uses which, while unauthorised, must be tolerated, as reflected in the 
copyright exceptions (i.e. whether the content is used in a manner which constitutes 
‘fair use’, ‘fair dealing’ or other specific exceptions), the amount of the work used is 
insubstantial, or because the work is in the public domain. This shortcoming can easily 
be explained by how this technology works. Indeed, if the dabatase was required to 
store full-length video or audio files of all protected works, the database would be 
immense and cumbersome to interrogate. Thus, in order to make the system efficient, 
the reference file created through Content ID only retains parts of the content using 
fingerprinting technology. As soon as this unique identifier is found, the usage policy 
chosen by the claimant is automatically applied without any consideration of 
lawfulness.  
                                                             
86 Or statistical snippets based on full-length reference files. E.g. samples could be taken from the 
original work at random intervals. Additionally, it can also scan all previously uploaded content with 
a reference files fed into Content ID a posteriori via its ‘legacy scan’.  See YouTube’s support page, 
available at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3244015?hl=en-GB  
87 E.g. the more if the use of the protected content is rather limited, the right-holder might choose to 
monetise it whereas if the use results in a 90% or more reproduction of the reference file, the right-
holder might choose to block the video (proportion match).  
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YouTube introduced an internal dispute resolution system as required under section 
512(g) DMCA. Once notified of a copyright ‘strike’, the uploader is given the option 
of challenging the claim.88 If the claim is disputed, using the online procedure 
provided on the YouTube platform, the right-holder receives an electronic 
notification, and has 30 days to answer. At this point, if the right-holder agrees that 
the infringment claim is ill-founded, the claim can be released, and the uploader is 
able to restore the monetisation settings.89 But, if the right-holder decides to maintain 
their claim, the block etc. will remain in place unless the uploader files an appeal.90 
Yet, there is no adjudication at this level either, placing all control in the hands of right-
holders.91  
Finally, the right-holder can decide to issue a manual takedown92 notification request 
which means that YouTube, as hosting intermediary, will have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the allegedly infringing content and will have to expeditiously respond 
to the notice as per the safe harbour provisions.  
Consequences of dispute resolution automation for copyright enforcement 
As is apparent from the preceding description, a disputed copyright claim can be 
accepted or rejected by the claimant without any independent human intervention. 
Indeed, it is understood that YouTube deliberately adopted and fully automated the 
process to avoid having employees’ assessment of the legitimacy of the content 
jeopardise the platform’s safe harbour eligibility. However, it is apparent that a fully 
automated process tilts the scale (sometimes unjustifiably) in favour of right-holders, 
rather than the individuals and creators uploading content. The latter may capitulate 
                                                             
88 One might wonder the efficiency of this internal dispute resolution settlement as this platform heavily 
relies on UGC and yet, Content ID claims are disputed less than 1% per YouTube.  
89 Additionally, the right-holder receives the personal data of the alleged infringer. This has therefore a 
deterrent effect on the use of this internal dispute settlement system. 
90 https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7000961. 
91 Unless this is a clear-cut US fair use case that YouTube picked to defend. 
92 In which case, the video displays the following statement: ‘This video is no longer available due to a 
copyright claim by [right-holder]’. This can lead to a copyright ‘strike’ on the uploader’s account. After 
three strikes, the account is terminated, its videos are removed, and the user’s ability to create new 
accounts is impaired. 
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because they are unfamiliar with the dispute resolution process, or because they do 
not have resources to challenge the right-holder. 
This process is not entirely inconsistent with the nature of copyright exceptions. 
Unlike a legal ‘right’, exceptions merely provide a defence in response to an allegation 
of infringement. This means that a user wishing to rely upon an exception to justify 
the use of a copyright work is unable to assert any right (e.g. by initiating legal 
proceedings via a declaration of non-infringement). The only way to determine 
definitively whether content is permitted (because of a copyright exception) is to wait 
to be sued by the right-holder for infringement, and to run the defence before the 
court. YouTube has sought to address this imbalance by offering to cover the legal 
costs of users in a limited number of clear-cut fair use cases in the USA.93 It remains to 
be seen whether this initiative proves to be successful, but in any event, there has been 
no indication that the scheme is being extended into the EU.  
Disputes may be multi-partied, and consequently, we must review the law on who 
might have a legitimate claim to ownership of content on YouTube. As we know from 
copyright law, a video is characterised by the multi-layering of protection. Copyright 
can subsist in each authorial works (literary, dramatic, musical) but also in the 
entrepreneurial works (sound recording or film). This multitude of potential right-
holders does not seem to be reflected in the way Content ID works. The asset metadata 
of a video contains various information including content ownership. Whilst the 
default option assumes that a Content ID partner has worldwide rights over the 
content, multiple partners can decide to share the ownership of content in different 
territories.94 Despite, the availablity of ‘embedded assets’ to differentiate copyright 
right-holders linked with their work, Content ID can only accommodate a single right-
holder per asset per country. There are currently four types of assets related to a piece 
of intellectual property following YouTube: (1) Music videos, referring to audiovisual 
                                                             
93 Fred von Lonhmann, A step toward protecting fair use on YouTube (19/11/2015) available at 
https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2015/11/a-step-toward-protecting-fair-use-on.html  
94 Possibility for the uploader to choose the ‘block views outside ownership’. This will block the content 
from being accessible in a different territory. 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6303378?hl=en-GB  
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content, often a promotional clip provided by a record label; (2) sound recordings, the 
audio recording usually provided by the record label; (3) compositions which here 
only refers to the musical score provided by music publishers; and, (4) art tracks, the 
YouTube automated version of the sound recording.95 These assets inadequately 
reflect the categories of works protected under copyright. Not only does YouTube’s 
categorisation ignore the multitude of creators involved in a work but it leaves out the 
authors of literary works and performers.  
The situation becomes even more complex where more than one Content ID partner 
issue a claim over a video in the same territory. Currently, YouTube associates the 
match policy from each partner with the video per the agreement between YouTube 
and a Content ID partner - e.g. if there are multiple different valid policies, YouTube 
applies the most restrictive option.96 If multiple monetising claims are made, the ad-
generated revenue is split between the claimants except (apparently) in the case of 
music.97  
Efficiency of AAPSs for providing a sustainable environment for copyright works 
online 
Despite its impressive structure, Content ID continues to face heavy criticism from 
both right-holders and the wider YouTube community.98 Given the increasing reliance 
                                                             
95 https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2822002?hl=en  
96 This led YouTubers such as Jim Sterling, to trick the system with a ‘copyright deadlock’. If a content 
creator knows that a particular content will be eventually picked up by Content ID and imposed a 
particular match policy such as monetising, the user can counter the application of the policy by 
including content from a right-holder who selected to not monetise, seen by the algorithm as more 
restrictive. See http://www.thejimquisition.com/copyright-deadlock-the-jimquisition/  
97 https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6300781?hl=en  
98 Multiple examples can be listed, the following constitute a mere selection amongst plenty: the muting 
of the stream of the official Game Advertisements (1/12/2016) while the unofficial video of the award 
show remained viewable on the platform, see http://www.thejimquisition.com/lets-take-a-moment-
to-laugh-at-contentid-fucking-up-the-game-awards/; 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/23/copyright-law-internet-mumsnet; Team 
Four Star’s channel being blocked (known for parodies of Dragon Ball Z); content creators having their 
content blocked by publishers of said content creators on their behalf (see 
http://www.escapistmagazine.com/forums/read/7.837159-YouTube-Issued-Copyright-Claims-
Against-Miracle-of-Sound);; the blocking of the NASA’s mission to mars video. Parker Higgins, Mars 
Landing videos, and other casualties of the robot wars (8/8/2012) EFF, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/mars-landing-videos-and-other-casualties-robot-wars. 
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on AAPSs, this section aims at revisiting the suitability of Content ID in tackling online 
copyright infringement and fostering creativity.  
Firstly, the system relies on a ‘first-come, first-served’ policy insofar as the first party 
to create a Content ID reference file (usually a collecting rights society), will be 
assumed as the copyright owner. Furthermore, if a person claims ownership of a 
video, this claim is accepted at face value. Sadly, the proposed new EU regime does 
not provide any safeguards against such abuses. While several parties may claim 
entitlement to a video in different countries, there can be only one claimant over the 
same content in the same territory, meaning that the multi-layering of copyright 
protection is not reflected adequately in this system.  
Secondly, some potentially infringing uses may never be detected, because Content 
ID does not detect a ‘match’ under a certain number of seconds. While many 15-second 
snippets of a protected work may be too insignificant to be an actionable infringement, 
what comprises a ‘substantial part’ of a copyright-protected work should be assessed 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. By adopting a quantitative criterion only 
(decided by the right-holder), Content ID is simply not equipped to detect substantial 
qualitative reproductions.  
Thirdly, Content ID may lead to over-blocking99 of content. The working presumption 
is that a use is infringing to safeguard the eligibility under the safe harbour 
provisions.100 Fourthly, this scheme relies on ‘best practices’ as negotiated between 
right-holders and the intermediary. This overlooks the third, and arguably most 
important, stakeholder i.e. the public. It can result in counter-intuitive policy decisions 
                                                             
99 Especially when mirrored by automated systems adopted by right-holders as well. Though 
presumably, a claim for breach of contract could be brought against the intermediary under the DMCA 
(§ 512(g)(1)) as liability exemption under the US safe harbour provision is subject to the good faith of 
intermediaries. Such provision is not mandatory in the E-commerce Directive but left to the national 
legislator’s appreciation. OECD, The role of intermediaries in advancing public policy objectives (OECD 
Publishing, 2011), 84; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression (16/5/2011) A/HRC/17/27, para. 42. 
100 Resulting in ‘false positives’. Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, ‘Copyright False Positives’ (2013) 
89(1) Notre Dame Law Review, 319 available at 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1704&context=ndlr.  
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- e.g. that YouTube ranks ‘monitoring viewing statistics’ as a more restrictive right-
holder’s option than electing to monetise a protected video. Finally, adopting an 
entirely automated system to determine what is and what is not legitimate use, 
without human oversight, gives the last word to the right-holder.101 Especially with 
the increase of bilateral automation102, the customisation of desired protocols to be 
applied inevitably favours some interests over others, meaning that the whole system 
fails to respect the established principle of due process, unfairness, and lack of 
confidence in the system are the inevitable result. While early algorithms relied upon 
human decision-making rules, the increasing use of ‘smart’ algorithms, capable of 
learning from previous scenarios, currently sits uneasily with copyright law which 
developed on the premise that context is important, and outcomes are fact-dependent, 
meaning infringement must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
While the technology has its limitations and the future of its development is hard to 
predict,103 currently, the crux of the problem lies in the willingness of intermediaries 
to introduce these AAPSs voluntarily, and to negotiate ‘best practices’ for tackling 
online infringement with copyright industries behind closed doors. It is unsurprising 
that the results favour commercial interests, and fail to take account of the public 
interest, freedom of expression and free flow of information.  
Google would have us believe that only rarely do right-holders choose to block 
content, asserting that right-holders typically choose to monetise content instead. 
They suggest freedom of expression is allowed to flourish, while permitting right-
holders’ to accumulate a fair share of any revenue which results from the use of a 
protected work. However, this cosy picture of an ecosystem where everyone benefits 
begs competition-related questions, since the manner in which the algorithms are 
actually used seems to reinforce the market power of the right-holders,104 while 
                                                             
101 Boroughf, supra footnote 11, 109. 
102 Meaning that both right-holders and intermediaries rely on similar technology to identify content 
and notify the intermediary.  
103 This is reinforced by the fact that YouTube keeps Content ID algorithm secret, giving Google a 
competitive edge over competitors. 
104 Boroughf, supra footnote 11, 112. 
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disadvantaging new, smaller players on the platform. Although copyright protection 
is typically justified within a market economy as being pro-competitive, it might seem 
that the current operation is more likely to hinder competition, and to create a chilling 
effect on creativity and innovation, rather than promoting it.105  
The need to promote freedom of expression, innovation and cultural diversity 
Whilst the previous sections highlighted how the current legal framework may be 
conducive to automation, giving rise to new business opportunities for right-holders 
to transact with alleged infringers, it simultaneously presents challenges for the 
preservation of fundamental rights and relatedly, the promotion of culture.    
Failure to preserve and promote cultural diversity in the current state of play 
One of the assumptions here is that diversity matters.  If it did not, there would be less 
to worry about the effect of AAPSs. Equally important is the assumption that there 
may be a tension between freedom of expression and cultural diversity, and that in 
promoting one it may be necessary to qualify, if not sacrifice, the other. These thoughts 
derive from a long tradition of political thought, stretching from John Stuart Mill in 
the 19th century to Nancy Fraser in the 21st, and these writers all highlight the need 
for, and difficulty of, reconciling cultural diversity with freedom of expression.106     
Despite the promise of promoting and protecting cultural diversity, the current legal 
framework fails to provide the incentives and remedies necessary to hold stakeholders 
                                                             
105 Recital 1 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29/4/2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (as opposed to the role of Internet intermediaries described 
in 2008 and repeated in 2011 by the OECD). OECD, The role of intermediaries in advancing public policy 
objectives (OECD Publishing, 2011), 61.  
106 Political stance arguing for the liberty of choices: John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’, in ‘On Liberty’, 
‘Considerations on Representative Government, ‘Utilitarianism’ (Everyman Edition, 1972); Economic theory 
supporting free market of ideas: F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, 2001); Cultural argument 
pleading for multiculturalism: Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (OUP, 1996); Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition (Princeton University 
Press, 1992); Nancy Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (  Verso, 
2004).  
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to this promise. This explains why the international legal framework rests on the links 
between culture and human rights.107  
Fuelled by the new opportunities offered by the Internet and the advent of 
technologies, a merciless struggle over the expansion of copyright claims has 
emerged, at the expense of freedom of expression and, more generally, the 
preservation of cultural diversity. On the one hand, freedom of expression grants 
every individual the right to impart, receive and seek information and ideas freely and 
is at the heart of diversity within cultural expression, creativity and innovation.108 
Consequently, this fundamental right is essential to preserve the individual’s right to 
participate freely in the cultural life of society.109 On the other hand, copyright 
legislation strikes a balance between ensuring incentives for authors to create and 
disseminate new original cultural expressions by granting them a bundle of exclusive 
rights110 in connection to their works, the public domain, and the breathing space 
necessary to allow further cultural expressions to flourish through the interplay of 
copyright requirements, duration and exceptions and limitations.111  
Inasmuch as the goals are freedom of cultural expression, promotion of creativity and 
facilitation of economic growth, both freedom of expression and copyright must be 
                                                             
107 Article 27 UDHR, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 10/12/1948 subsequently 
mirrored in article 15 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
108 Protection of Freedom of expression is widely recognised at international level: Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’); Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
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considered as complementary rather than in conflict.112 But, the digital era has issued 
new challenges both to the preservation of freedom of expression and copyright 
protection. This is explained by the difficulty of enforcing property rights in a 
borderless world but also by AAPSs giving copyright owners the means to control all 
uses made of their works, to derive revenues from any uses made of their works and 
to block undesired third party uses.  
Attempts at recalibrating copyright theories 
These challenges have urged scholars to rethink the purposes of copyright in the 
online environment. Three schools of thoughts can be distinguished. The pure 
economic property theory113 argues for broad property rights and maximum 
enforcement of these rights, whereas the incentive theory argues that one new creative 
expression is not inherently more valuable than any other, meaning there is a need to 
ensure enough enforcement to recoup the original investment made but maximum 
enforcement is not always required.114   
This leads to the last school of thought which conceptualises copyright under a 
democratic paradigm. Following Netanel’s seminal work,115 copyright law must be 
shaped to support a democratic civil society. Departing from the purely economic 
approach, Netanel argues that ‘copyright may operate in the market’ but ‘copyright’s 
goals are not of the market’.116 Therefore, strong copyright protection is required but 
not absolute exclusive rights. By suggesting a democracy-enhancing theory as a 
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palliative to pure economic theory, Netanel offers an opportunity to allocate more 
weight to copyright exceptions and limitations.117 Neither of these theories are 
optimal, and due consideration of their benefits and pitfalls goes beyond this 
research.118 This research builds upon the idea that copyright contribute to preserving 
democratic values in society. This implies that principles of democracy should operate 
within national territories, but also across territories at the regional or global level.119 
One of the challenges being: to ensure that individuals can be heard beyond the 
borders of the nation-state and that this privilege is not confined to a few major, global 
players.120 If the latter, the effect is likely to be detrimental to national cultures because 
of a convergence around certain predominant cultures.121 The incentive theory has a 
lesser deterrent effect and enables recalibration of the copyright paradigm reconciling 
this proprietary regime with freedom of expression, and fosters cultural identity.  
Considering the promotion of cultural diversity as an end,122 freedom of expression 
and copyright become how we enhance the interaction between cultures and promote 
democratic values but equally economic growth and creativity.  
Conclusion 
One of the biggest challenges of algorithm-based decision-making relying on 
voluntary agreements between intermediaries and right-holders is to ensure due 
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process and compatibility with human rights. As pointed out in the OSCE Report,123 
the voluntary AAPSs implemented by private entities are in breach of the right to 
freedom of expression unless the three-pronged test is respected.124   Indeed, any 
match & block policy applied without human scrutiny should be considered as a 
disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression due to the likely result of over-
blocking. 
Additionally, to respect the rule of law, recourse to courts or other independent bodies 
should be possible to guarantee the respect of fundamental rights.125 As AAPSs rely 
on pre-selected policies applicable to any future matches identified, the resulting 
blocking of content could be incompatible with the right of freedom of expression, as 
the interference may be disproportionate to the legitimate objective pursued. Yet, this 
essential part of the three-pronged test, with which any restriction to the right to 
freedom of expression must comply, appears to be currently lacking. Based on how 
Content ID operates, claimants (self-proclaimed copyright owners) have the upper 
hand in the internal dispute resolution system. Therefore, the user and possibly 
content creator, has inefficient and insufficient means to exercise his/her right to 
freedom of expression even in the event where a copyright exception is applicable.126 
Finally, these pre-chosen match policies can amount to a form of censorship in the 
hands of claimants, resulting in a chilling effect on creativity, diversity and more 
generally, citizen participation in a democratic society.  
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Consequently, the fact that intermediaries may be held liable for third-party content 
is equally problematic. Besides the economic analysis and tort law, 127 there are also 
emerging concerns as to whether this liability model is compatible with human rights 
as it amounts to an interference. While the current EU legal framework and that 
proposed by the Commission do not require the involvement of the judiciary before 
the blocking or removal of content, the only way for the intermediary to be exempt 
from liability is to comply with the red flag or match detection by the algorithm. Under 
the current state of play, there is very little incentive for intermediaries to scrutinise 
human rights and more especially, freedom of expression compliance.128 The threat of 
being liable deters intermediaries from challenging the unjustified blocking of specific 
content, leading to the automated over-blocking with no balancing mechanism and 
endangerment of cultural diversity in the long run. 
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